Fungible Convictions

Saving face in international relations has been a stereotype of Asian, especially Japanese, diplomacy, but it’s clear tonight after this New York Times report on covert operations against Iran that saving face has profound implications for avoiding war:

The interviews also indicate that Mr. Bush was convinced by top administration officials, led by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, that any overt attack on Iran would probably prove ineffective, lead to the expulsion of international inspectors and drive Iran’s nuclear effort further out of view. Mr. Bush and his aides also discussed the possibility that an airstrike could ignite a broad Middle East war in which America’s 140,000 troops in Iraq would inevitably become involved.

Instead, Mr. Bush embraced more intensive covert operations actions aimed at Iran, the interviews show, having concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies were failing to slow the uranium enrichment efforts. Those covert operations, and the question of whether Israel will settle for something less than a conventional attack on Iran, pose immediate and wrenching decisions for Mr. Obama.

What this says is, a visible, overt attack will ignite a multi-country full-scale war, but an invisible, covert attack will result in no overt reprisal. Specifically, for Israel with American help to eliminate the Iranian reactor at Natanz with a tactical raid or aerial bombardment, that would cause a region-wide war, inevitably involving the 140,000 American troops in Iraq. But to achieve the exact same result—the elimination of the Natanz reactor—through espionage, no overt retaliation could occur without Iran admitting that its security isn’t up to snuff.

The latter sounds much better.

It makes me thankful that we have people willing to do just that, at least given legitimate ends and a strong chain of command.

Problem: North Korea is test-firing long-range missiles that could reach the United States. The U.S. wants North Korea to stop firing missiles.

North Korea, however, has not attacked a nation and has not broken any treaties. There are no grounds for a military response. Thus, North Korea still develops its weapons and threatens its neighbors and the United States.

Solution: North Korea’s Taepodong-II missile has a range of 9,000 miles. That’s far. To make things worse, as of today, North Korea is here:

A bad location. Abutting South Korea. In the same cul-de-sac as Japan. A short trip to the U.S.

But need North Korea be in such a bad location?

Believe it or not, the answer is no. North Korea’s location—and threatening proximity to other countries—need not be . . .

. . . because North Korea, like other countries, can be made to move.

For example, look:

That’s in the 1600′s. There was a larger buffer between America and East Asia in those days. Many dragons’ worth of buffer.

Pretty safe.

Earlier than that, in this detailed Arab map of Asia, North Korea was very, very buffered . . .

See?

So forget sabre-rattling and diplomacy. The real solution is to move the country again. North Korea: no neighbors—no threat.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is dead. Osama bin Laden is in hiding. Saddam Hussein is on trial.

This is a list of American military successes, sure. But it’s also an indication of another way the “War on Terror” is unique: it is the first war in which the enemies are personalities.

And not just the enemies—it’s all the players. Iraq is “Rumsfeld’s War,” or Bush’s war of choice, but never quite described as America’s decision. The case for war is inextricably tied to Colin Powell and his presentation to the U.N. in 2003. The “Blair government” raised questions about the Nigerien-Iraqi uranium connection, but not the British.

This is how the War on Terror will be waged, using not just bold imagery (as all modern wars have been) but also the creation of bold, indelible personalities. The death of Zarqawi has been hailed as a turning point in the battle for Iraq, the death of an egotistical, publicly disliked goof who didn’t know how to fire an automatic weapon who was nevertheless described by the U.S. government through the press as some sort of inspirational mastermind.

President Bush described him today as the “operational commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Bin Laden described him as the “prince of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” He planned the massive bombing of the U.N. headquarters that launched the ultraviolent phase Iraq now lives and dies through. He is thought to have planned the bombing of the holiest Shiite mosque and to have personally beheaded American contractor Nicolas Berg.

In what other war has there ever been such a strong connection between the war itself and individuals? Patton, Rommel, Ho Chi Minh, Jackson, Hirohito—there is an endless list of famous and infamous characters in war, but never before has a nation’s military been mobilized to attack lone personalities.

The irony obviously is that with Zarqawi’s death, as with Hussein’s sons’ deaths, the strategic gain, though significant, falls far short of the artificial enormity of the character. Should the American or Afghani or Pakistani army capture Osama bin Laden, the experience will be the same: extraordinary catharsis followed by little essential change in the position of the “front” in the War on Terror.

So the question is, how responsible is it for leaders and the rest of us to frame this terribly complex war in terms of individuals? We have no armies to fight our army. We have faceless cells, some of which are home-grown, and ad hoc militias. What good does it do to pour responsibility for a widespread militant Islamist ideology into the mold of the individual militant Islamist?

In the same way that modern governments live by the image and die by the image, doesn’t living by the manufactured personality mean we die by it too, that for every charismatic personality we elevate to icon—by ignoring the complexities of a movement—we just ordain another martyr?

GoogleHum

Overview: Allows anyone with a microphone to hum, sing, whistle, or
play a melody and promptly view a list of songs, complete for the
history of the world, that use that melody.

Features:
- Supports audio input from multiple voices, any instrument, and most
music software, such as Apple’s GarageBand.

- Focuses as much on rhythm as pitch, creating acceptable results for
off-key searches.

- “I’m feeling lucky” replaced with “It’s driving me nuts” button.

Drawbacks:
- Can be used to prove that every #1 song since 1964 was based on the
Beatles’ “I Want to Hold Your Hand,” except for Billy Ocean’s “Get
Outta My Dreams, Get Into My Car,” which was lifted whole-cloth from
Mongolian throat-singing.

- Jinglists union concerned that Google will use search data to create
world’s catchiest tune.

GoogleWar

Overview: First engine to incorporate both search and destroy functionality.

Features:
- Finds, targets, and bombs enemies. Essentially an integration of
Google Earth, Google Sets, and Google Ride Finder.

- Using the popular MAD (Mass Analytics and Division) plugin, can
identify hostile targets within a friendly population. Perfect for
separating extremists from moderates. (Works in Firefox and IE6+ only)

- “I’m feeling lucky” replaced with “Do you feel lucky, well, do you?” button.

- Downloadable sourcecode allows for easy GoogleWar mash-ups with
CraigsList apartment listings.

Drawbacks:

- Bug in beta disables back button.