Fungible Convictions

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is dead. Osama bin Laden is in hiding. Saddam Hussein is on trial.

This is a list of American military successes, sure. But it’s also an indication of another way the “War on Terror” is unique: it is the first war in which the enemies are personalities.

And not just the enemies—it’s all the players. Iraq is “Rumsfeld’s War,” or Bush’s war of choice, but never quite described as America’s decision. The case for war is inextricably tied to Colin Powell and his presentation to the U.N. in 2003. The “Blair government” raised questions about the Nigerien-Iraqi uranium connection, but not the British.

This is how the War on Terror will be waged, using not just bold imagery (as all modern wars have been) but also the creation of bold, indelible personalities. The death of Zarqawi has been hailed as a turning point in the battle for Iraq, the death of an egotistical, publicly disliked goof who didn’t know how to fire an automatic weapon who was nevertheless described by the U.S. government through the press as some sort of inspirational mastermind.

President Bush described him today as the “operational commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Bin Laden described him as the “prince of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” He planned the massive bombing of the U.N. headquarters that launched the ultraviolent phase Iraq now lives and dies through. He is thought to have planned the bombing of the holiest Shiite mosque and to have personally beheaded American contractor Nicolas Berg.

In what other war has there ever been such a strong connection between the war itself and individuals? Patton, Rommel, Ho Chi Minh, Jackson, Hirohito—there is an endless list of famous and infamous characters in war, but never before has a nation’s military been mobilized to attack lone personalities.

The irony obviously is that with Zarqawi’s death, as with Hussein’s sons’ deaths, the strategic gain, though significant, falls far short of the artificial enormity of the character. Should the American or Afghani or Pakistani army capture Osama bin Laden, the experience will be the same: extraordinary catharsis followed by little essential change in the position of the “front” in the War on Terror.

So the question is, how responsible is it for leaders and the rest of us to frame this terribly complex war in terms of individuals? We have no armies to fight our army. We have faceless cells, some of which are home-grown, and ad hoc militias. What good does it do to pour responsibility for a widespread militant Islamist ideology into the mold of the individual militant Islamist?

In the same way that modern governments live by the image and die by the image, doesn’t living by the manufactured personality mean we die by it too, that for every charismatic personality we elevate to icon—by ignoring the complexities of a movement—we just ordain another martyr?